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1 Introduction  
The last decades have been characterised by financial liberalisation and internationalisation 
of financial markets. Still, the financial sector has remained more tightly regulated than 
most others. Due to financial institutions‟, and especially banks‟, crucial position within 
financial markets and their systemic nature, financial liberalisation has walked hand in 
hand with stricter industry regulation.
1
  
 
In the EU a certain overall level of harmonisation is sought in all Member States, also 
within the financial sector, extending to Norway through its EEA Membership and the 
EEA Agreement. An important part of this harmonisation, although often set aside in 
favour of the more pressing questions of capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, is the 
regulation of the taking-up of businesses and pursuit of holdings within the financial sector. 
Through a long line of Internal Market directives the European Commission has attempted 
to provide harmonised prudential assessment regulation and authorisation practices for the 
taking up and pursuit of businesses within the sector.  
 
This article discusses Norwegian private ownership regulation in regards to the taking up 
and pursuit of the businesses of credit institutions and (life) insurance undertakings and its 
legitimacy under EEA law. In chapters 2 and 3 we review the legal method of 
interpretation and the relevant regulatory scenery. Subsequently, chapter 4 discusses 
Norwegian assessment practice relating to pursuit of the business of financial institutions, 
while chapter 5 discusses the assessment practice relating to the taking up of these 
businesses, as well as the Norwegian public offering rules for credit institutions and 
insurance undertakings. 
  
                                                 
1
 Cranston (1997), p. 68-84 
  2 
2 Legal method of interpretation 
EC law constitutes an extraordinary form of legal framework. Its foundation and nature is 
public international law
2
 in as far as it is established through multilateral treaties between 
autonomous states.
3
 Still it is unique in its structure and authority due to its characteristic 
supra-nationality
4
, rendering it more forceful than common public international law.
5
 The 
political aspect of the cooperation between the Community countries is strong, and the 
dynamic legal and political integration in the EC has often been referred to as “integration 
through law”6, an integration which is slowly taking on the form of a “constitutionalization 
of the treaty system”7. Supra-nationality in the form of upward transfer of governmental 
decision-making authority to EC Authorities is not imposed on the EFTA States as they are 
not part of the EU. However, these Authorities‟ presence is felt also in EFTA Countries, 
largely through their obligation to implement EC law constructed at a Community level. 
 
In the attempt to provide a thorough examination of the ownership restriction rules in 
Norway, this article draws on legal sources of the three main jurisdictions involved; namely 
Norway, the EEA and the EU.  
 
When interpreting the provisions of the EEA Agreement, this article conforms to 
established standards for legal interpretation. However, due to the special legal nature of 
EC law, and the specific connection established between Norway and the EU through the 
EEA Agreement, it is necessary to quickly review the authority and relevance of both EEA 
law and EU law in terms of our current topic.  
 
                                                 
2
 Craig (1999) p. 69  
3
 EØS-rett (2004) p. 82 
4
 The Free Dictionary (2001) 
5
 EØS-rett (2004) p. 41 
6
 Vauches (2008)  
7
 Sweet (2005) p. 4 
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The provisions of the EEA Agreement are a reflection of the EC Treaty anno 1992.
8
 
Norway signed the EEA Agreement 2 May 1992, and the agreement came into force 
commencing 1 January 1994.
9
 Since then Norway has been an integrated part of the 
internal market; or at least as integrated as is possible without actually joining the EU. This 
affiliation with the internal market brought on the obligation to loyally implement EEA law 
into domestic law.
10
  
 
With the EEA Agreement being the formal connection to the internal market, establishing 
EEA law as a separate legal discipline, EU law is not directly relevant to matters falling 
within the ambit of EEA jurisdiction. However, the core objective embodied in the 
Agreement is to create homogeneity across the European Economic Area.
11
 This is 
expressed through its main operating principle of interpretation, as described in Article 6: 
 
Article 6 
“Without prejudice to future developments of case law, the provisions of this Agreement, in so far as they are 
identical in substance to corresponding rules of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
... and to acts adopted in application [thereof], shall, in their implementation and application, be interpreted 
in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities given prior to the 
date of signature of this Agreement.” 
 
As seen in Article 6, the Agreement establishes the European Court of Justice‟s case law as 
a relevant legal source when employing EEA law, and therefore also partly EU law itself. 
The scope of this Article is clearly not unlimited, which becomes apparent through its 
explicit reference to the date of signature. The intersection was made in order not to grant 
the ECJ extensive jurisdiction to single-handedly decide the legal development in the 
EEA.
12
 On the other hand, the reservation taken for “future developments of case law” is 
meant to allow EEA law to evolve alongside EU law in coherence with the principles of 
                                                 
8
 The EEA Treaty has not been amended since its ratification, except for the incorporation of new EU 
member states. 
9
 EØS-rett (2004) p. 34 
10
 EEA art 3, EC art 10 
11
 EEA art 1(1) 
12
 EØS-rett (2004) p. 203 
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homogeneity and dynamic development
13
, albeit only within areas of law already covered 
by the Agreement.
14
 This means that ECJ rulings pronounced after 1992 are relevant to 
EEA law. In terms of the EFTA Court‟s practice of EEA law, this method of interpretation 
is proscribed directly in the Surveillance and Court Agreement
15
, but this peculiarity has 
proven not to be a practical problem in domestic law either.
16
  
 
In the next chapter we will provide a detailed overview of the regulatory landscape relating 
to ownership restrictions in credit institutions and insurance companies in Norway. Banks 
and insurance companies will collectively be referred to as „financial institutions‟. 
  
                                                 
13
 ibid., p. 177 – 178 
14
 EEA art 102 
15
 Surveillance and Court Agreement art 3(2) 
16
 Rognstad (2001) p. 448 – 449; Bull (2002) p. 80-81 
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3 The regulatory scenery 
3.1 The financial sector as part of the EU Internal Market 
The financial sector is part of the EU‟s single European market agenda.17 This entails the 
harmonisation of laws and practice between all Member States in order to achieve the EC 
Treaty‟s core single market objectives of freedom of establishment18, supply of services19 
and movements of capital
20
 within the Union.
21
 In the market for financial services, this 
harmonisation promotes the removal of internal barriers to cross-border provision of 
services and the establishment of branches anywhere in the EU, by a financial institution 
situated elsewhere in the Union.
22
 These goals are extended to the EEA through the EEA 
Agreement. 
 
The harmonisation is facilitated by means of “mutual recognition” and the so-called “single 
licence” practice. The mutual recognition provides a “passport” for financial institutions, 
allowing them to establish branches and/or provide services cross-border in all areas of the 
EU. This means that only one single licence is needed – in other words, a financial 
institution only requires authorisation in one State, automatically making it allegeable to do 
business in all other Member States as well.
23
 However, domestic host State regulation will 
apply to the conduct of business and provision of services within its jurisdiction, which can 
vary from State to State. 
 
This procedure is based on the “home country control principle”. This principle bestows 
upon the competent authorities of a financial institution‟s Home Member State24 the 
primary role of its authorisation and prudential supervision.
25
  This means that any host 
                                                 
17
 Cranston (1997) p. 470 
18
 EEA art 31; EC art 43 
19
 EEA art 36; EC art 49 
20
 EEA art 40; former EC art 67(1) 
21
  Cranston (1995) p. 26 
22
 Cranston (1997) p. 470 
23
 ibid., p. 470-471 
24
 The Member state in which a credit institution has been authorised in accordance with Directive 
2006/48/EC art 6 to 9, 11 to 14 
25
 European Commission, White Paper (1985) p. 28 para. 103 
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Member State
26
 in which a credit institution would choose to set up a branch or provide 
services is granted a complementary role. Ever since the first introduction of the internal 
market programme in 1985, this has been the prevailing method for regulating cross-border 
financial services within the EU and later the EEA, even following an abundance of 
directive amendments and recasts.
27
 
 
However, for Member States to agree to the mutual recognition procedure, there obviously 
needs to be some minimum harmonisation of national regulatory standards for financial 
institutions.
28
 The EC has been able to achieve detailed harmonisation in many discrete 
areas of law where strong consensus was obtainable. This has not proven to be the case 
more generally for the financial services sector, thus Member States have retained a high 
level of competence. To overcome this obstacle to harmonisation, focus has been on 
identifying the respective roles of the EC law-making institutions versus the Member 
States, and to harmonise the law and practice of Member States as far as possible through a 
variety of directives.
29
 The “home country control principle” has prevailed as a means of 
dividing competence between Member States in the financial services sector. 
 
In the areas of banking and insurance, a long line of minimum harmonisation directives 
have been given. In the following chapters we will focus on the most recent Directives 
2002/83/EC (“Insurance Directive”), Directive 2006/48/EC (“Banking Directive”) and 
2007/44/EC (“Qualifying Holdings Directive”); more specifically their regulation of 
ownership control in credit institutions and insurance companies. The remainder of this 
chapter is descriptive in nature; the specific analyses will follow in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
                                                 
26
 The Member State in which a credit institution has a branch or in which it provides services, Dir 
2006/48/EC art 4(8) 
27
 See current Dir 2006/48/EC and Dir 2002/83/EC  
28
 Lomnicka (2002) p. 298  
29
 ibid., p. 296  
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3.2 The regulation of ownership control in financial institutions in the EEA 
Ownership control in credit institutions and insurance companies is regulated through 
secondary legislation in the form of Directives. The substantive legitimacy of this 
legislation is derived from the EC Treaty‟s and the EEA Agreement‟s main provisions 
regarding the right of establishment (Art 31 EEA), provision of services (Art 36 EEA) and 
the free movement of capital (Art 40 EEA). Part III of the Main Part of the EEA 
Agreement regulates these rights between EC Member States and EFTA States and the 
provisions are found in chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The respective Articles will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5. First we will have a look at the relevant EC 
Directives and the guidelines for prudential supervision provided by the Level-3 
Committees.  
 
3.2.1 Directives 2002/83/EC, 2006/48/EC and the amendment of 2007/44/EC 
Three EC Directives are of most importance to our current topic. The first is Directive 
2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 
concerning life assurance. The second is Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions. Both of these Directives regulate the taking up and the pursuit of 
business within their respective fields. The main consideration of the Directives is the 
necessity to complete the internal market in the field of credit institutions and direct life 
assurance, from the point of view of both the right of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services.
30
 In accordance with the earlier mentioned harmonisation problems 
within the financial sector, the Directives‟ Preambles underline the importance of only 
effecting the essential harmonisation necessary and sufficient to secure mutual 
recognition.
31
 The tone is set by the very first Article of Title II (“Requirements for access 
to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions”) of the Banking Directive, 
which gives the Member State the right to lay down the requirements for authorisation 
                                                 
30
 Dir 2006/48/EC Recital 3; Dir 2002/83/EC Recital 3 
31
 Dir 2006/48/EC Recital 7; Dir 2002/83/EC Recital 7 
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within its jurisdiction.
32
 The Directives regulate the granting of initial business 
authorisations and ownership control prior to such authorisation or a proposed acquisition 
or increase in holdings in financial institutions. 
 
Directive 2007/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 
is an amendment directive amending Council Directive 92/49/EC and Directives 
2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC as regards procedural rules and 
evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of holdings in 
the financial sector. The Directive addresses the lack of detailed criteria for the prudential 
assessment of acquisitions and the procedure for their application, standing in the way of a 
closer harmonisation within the financial sector.
33
 Thus, the amendment Directive provides 
a clear set of limited criteria of a strictly prudential nature for the assessment of potential 
acquirers and an administrative procedure, without allowing the Member States to lay 
down stricter rules.
34
 Note, however, that the 2007 Directive only amends the regulations 
relating to the pursuit of holdings in financial institutions, not the initial authorisation 
process at the taking up of these businesses. 
 
3.2.2 Guidelines on prudential supervision 
Three European Supervisory Authorities have been established within the EU‟s financial 
sector, specialising within the fields of banking, securities regulation, and insurance and 
occupational pensions. These are EBA (European Banking Authority, previously CEBS - 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors)
35
, ESMA (European Securities and Markets 
Authority, previously CESR - Committee of European Securities Regulators)
36
 and EIOPA 
(European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, previously CEIOPS - 
                                                 
32
 Art 6 
33
 Recital 2 
34
 Recital 3 and 6 
35
 EBA replaced CEBS as of 1 January 2011 
36
 ESMA replaced CESR as of 1 January 2011 
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Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors)
37
, collectively 
referred to as the Level-3 Committees of European Financial Supervisors. 
 
These Committees are independent EU Authorities, whose mission is to work towards the 
stability of the European Union‟s financial system through different measures, one of 
which is the development of prudential guidelines and recommendations within their fields. 
Their joint Level-3 operations focus on the development of guidelines and 
recommendations with the view to establish consistent, efficient and effective supervisory 
practices within the European System of Financial Supervision, as well as to ensure the 
common, uniform and consistent application of EU law.
38
 
 
In line with their agenda, the Level-3 Committees have developed prudential guidelines for 
the interpretation of Directive 2007/44/EC, namely the “Guidelines for the prudential 
assessment of acquisitions and increase of holdings in the financial sector required by 
Directive 2007/44/EC”39. According to the introductory statement of the official 
guidelines, the main goals are (1) to reach a common understanding on the five assessment 
criteria listed in the Directive, (2) to define appropriate cooperation arrangements between 
supervisors, and (3) to establish an exhaustive and harmonised list of information that 
potential acquirers need to include in their notifications to the competent supervisory 
authorities.
40
 For the purpose of this paper, goal number 1 is of most importance, and will 
be explored in more detail in chapter 4. 
 
Due to their influence on EU regulation through their prudential guidelines and 
recommendations, the Level-3 Committees‟ authoritative guidelines extend to EEA law 
through the requirement of loyal implementation of EC law. Thus, with implementation of 
the Directives comes the obligation to follow up the Level-3 Committees‟ prudential 
guidelines. 
                                                 
37
 EIOPA replaced CEIOPS as of 1 January 2011 
38
 ESMA (2011) 
39
 Level-3 Committees (2008) 
40
 ibid., p. 5 
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3.3 The regulation of ownership in financial institutions in Norway 
Ownership control in banks and insurance companies in Norway is mainly regulated 
through primary legislation in the form of statutes. These are based on the EC Directives 
above. Before having a closer look at the Norwegian regulation, we will review Norway‟s 
obligation to implement EEA law. 
 
3.3.1 Norway’s obligation to implement EEA law 
Norway, as one of the Nordic EFTA States, practices a dualistic approach to treaties. As a 
result any treaty entered into must be explicitly integrated in the legal system in order to be 
accepted as domestic law in line with other nationally developed legislation.
41
 Since the 
EEA Agreement is in fact an international public law treaty, this also applies in its respect. 
To the extent necessary to secure effective compliance with treaty provisions, public 
international law requires that treaties be loyally implemented in domestic law.
42
 Many 
provisions in the EEA Agreement are meant to give individuals certain rights, and in some 
cases to subject them to certain obligations. Thus the character of the Agreement itself 
implies an extensive responsibility of loyal implementation. 
 
Within the vocabulary of EEA and EU law, this duty is referred to as the “general principle 
of loyalty”.43 This principle is imbedded in the wording of Article 3 of the EEA 
Agreement, which requires the proper implementation of EEA law in the domestic legal 
system.
44
 This entails not only to “take all appropriate measures …  to ensure fulfilment of 
the obligations arising out of [the] Agreement”, but also to “abstain from any measures 
which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of [the] Agreement”. Article 3 has 
been interpreted to mean that all provisions that grant individuals rights or subject them to 
obligations must be implemented in domestic law.  
                                                 
41
 EØS-rett (2004) p. 185 
42
 ibid.  
43
 EEA art 3; EC art 5 
44
 EC art 10 
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Furthermore, Article 7 provides the standard for implementation of secondary legislation. 
According to its text, acts that are referred to or contained in an Annex to the Agreement or 
in decisions by the EEA Joint Committee are binding upon the parties, and thus have to be 
made a part of the internal legal order of a State. Article 7 provides that acts that are EEC 
regulations shall be made part of the internal legal order “as such”; while in the case of 
EEC directives it is left to the authorities of the relevant State to chose the form and method 
of implementation.
45
 The former entails the direct word for word translation of the EEC 
text, whereas directives are considered implemented as long as domestic substantive 
legislation conforms to that of the directive.
46
 However, according to ECJ rulings the 
implementation must take place in such a way that the rights and obligations present 
themselves to individuals as clear and unambiguous, in a manner allowing them to predict 
their legal status.
47
 
 
Norway practices two different forms of implementation for public international law, (1) 
incorporation through reference and (2) transformation through reproduction. In the former 
case, a single Article is created in domestic law, establishing that a treaty is given status as 
domestic legislation. In the latter case, the treaty is re-written in accordance with 
Norwegian legal technique and given a form and appearance consistent with domestic law, 
either in the form of statutory law or administrative regulation.
48
 For the adoption of the 
EEA Agreement, both of these techniques are used. The Main Part of the EEA Agreement 
is incorporated through reference in Article 1 of the EEA Act of 27 November 1992 no. 
109 and the EEC regulations are incorporated in statutory law or administrative regulation. 
The EEC directives on the other hand, which constitute the quantitative larger part of EEA 
law, are implemented by means of transformation in accordance with the freedom provided 
in Article 7 of the Agreement.  
 
                                                 
45
 Inspired by EC art 249 
46
 EØS-rett (2004) p. 187 
47
 ibid., p. 49 
48
 EØS-rett (2004) p. 188 
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3.3.2  The Norwegian legislation on ownership control  
The rules on ownership control in credit institutions and insurance companies provided by 
the Directives are implemented into several statutes, which regulate different aspects of the 
business of these institutions. In the following we will focus on the three main statutes of 
importance to our current topic, (1) the Act on Financing Activity and Financial Institutions 
(Financial Institutions Act)
49
, (2) the Act on Commercial Banks in Norway (Commercial 
Banks Act)
50
, and (3) the Act on Insurance Activity (Insurance Act)
51
.  
 
There is an overlap in the scope of these regulations. The Financial Institutions Act can be 
viewed as a general regulation, in so far as it covers both commercial banking and 
insurance activity, as well as other financial activity. In terms of ownership control in 
financial institutions, the act regulates the acquisition or increase of holdings in financial 
institutions by proscribing a “fit-and-proper” testing of the potential acquirer. The 
Commercial Banks Act and the Insurance Activity Act on the other hand regulate the 
taking up of these businesses and the initial ownership control in this respect.   
 
The design of the ownership control rules is governed by what we will argue is a political 
“principle of dispersed ownership”. This principle presents itself in all of the above 
mentioned legislation and thus in different stages of a financial institutions lifetime. In 
order to shed some light on this principle and its presence in the legislation, we will provide 
a short historical overview of the statutes and their adaption to EEA law. 
 
3.3.3 Historical recapitulation 
Prior to 2004 the Norwegian rules on ownership in financial institutions where “restriction” 
rules, not prudential “control” rules. The Financial Institutions Act contained the rule that 
no one was allowed to hold more than 10 percent of the share capital in a Norwegian 
                                                 
49
 Act of 10 June 1988 no. 40 
50
 Act of 25 May 1961 no. 2 
51
 Act of 10 June 2005 no. 44 
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financial institution.
52
 However, the EFTA Surveillance Authority argued that the 
Norwegian rule was in conflict with Article 40 in the EEA Agreement regarding the free 
movement of capital and pushed for a domestic reform.
53
 Norwegian competent authorities 
rejected this view but nevertheless started the process of altering the ownership restriction 
rule in 2003. The ownership restriction rule was exchanged with prudential ownership 
control rules for qualifying holdings, with the slight limitation of a built in 25 percent 
threshold for private ownership; if the authorities were not satisfied that a private owner 
fulfilled all the legal requirements of a sound and prudent owner they were to refuse his 
application.
54
 
 
In the preparatory works to that new legislation, the authorities restricted the practical use 
of the 25 percent limitation by establishing that private owners wanting to acquire holdings 
above 25 percent were only to be acknowledged in as far as the acquisition object only 
engaged in niche businesses within banking or insurance.
55
 The main motivations behind 
this rule were (1) to secure independence for financial institutions from private and other 
economic interests and (2) to avoid concentration of power in the ownership structure of 
these institutions.
56
 In other words, the political goal of achieving dispersed ownership was 
a strongly contributing factor. 
 
The authorities‟ practice of the 25 percent guideline became increasingly strict, as they 
initially accepted private holdings of up to 20 percent and proceeded to lower the threshold 
to 15 percent in one case.
57
 The written 25 percent rule was abandoned in legislation in 
2009; however the authorities may seem to continue to practice what can be called a 25 
percent, or lower, ownership restriction rule on private holdings in financial institutions.  
 
                                                 
52
 Former section 2-2 
53
 See Ministry of Finance (2002) 
54
 Former section 2-3 
55
 Ot.prp.nr. 50 (2002-2003) p. 24 – 26 
56
 ibid., p. 12-13  
57
 Bergo (2011) 
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Simultaneously with the regulatory change from ownership restriction to ownership control 
in 2004, new Sections 4 and 2-1 where implemented in the Commercial Banks Act and the 
Insurance Act respectively. These rules are still intact, and demand that more than three-
quarters of an institution‟s share capital is subscribed in connection with a capital increase 
effected without any pre-emption rights for shareholders or others, at the initial taking up of 
the business. Thus, “the principle of dispersed ownership” was made a decisive factor also 
at the initial establishment of an institution, in addition to already existing prudential 
control rules of the initial shareholders. 
 
The preparatory works to the 2004 reform clearly identify the connection between the 
ownership control rules and rules governing ownership at the initial formation of a 
financial institution, although not directly saying that the dispersed ownership rules were 
established in order to make up for the loss of the 10 percent restriction rule.
58
  
 
Today the “principle of dispersed ownership” can be seen in three different aspects: Firstly, 
through the “three-quarters rule” at the establishment of a financial institution, secondly 
through the “fit-and-proper” testing of shareholders at the initial taking up of the business, 
which could lead to either full authorisation, authorisation on certain terms, or dismissal, 
and lastly through the “fit-and-proper” testing of proposed acquirers of holdings in a 
financial institution after its establishment. 
 
In the following chapters we will review these regulations in reversed order, because the 
harmonisation with EU law has come the farthest in the area of “fit-and-proper” testing of 
potential acquirers, while there is still a long way to go in the area of initial licensing and 
ownership control at the taking up of the business of financial institutions. 
  
                                                 
58
 NOU 2002:3 p. 19; Ot.prp.nr. 50 (2002-2003) p. 45 
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4 The pursuit of investments in credit institutions and insurance 
companies in Norway 
 
4.1 Background 
On 12 September 2006 the European Commission presented its formal proposal for the 
amendment of Community rules relating to the prudential assessment of proposed 
acquisitions in the financial sector applicable to credit institutions, investment firms, and 
insurance and reinsurance companies (financial institutions). The purpose was threefold; to 
harmonise the conditions under which a proposed acquirer of a holding in a financial 
institution had to notify relevant authorities of his intent to acquire a holding, to define a 
clear and transparent procedure for the prudential assessment by competent authorities of 
the proposed acquisition, and to specify a set of clear and limited criteria of a strictly 
prudential nature for competent authorities to abide by in their assessment process.
59
 
Through these measures, the EC was hoping to achieve maximum harmonisation within 
these fields in all Member States. The efforts concluded in the 2007 Qualifying Holdings 
Directive (QHD), which were to be implemented by Member States within 21 March 
2009.
60
 The relevant rules regarding the pursuit of investments in credit institutions and 
insurance companies in Norway are incorporated in the Financial Institutions Act (FIA) 
chapter 2. 
 
4.2 The “principle of dispersed ownership” in domestic assessment practice 
Norwegian competent authorities practice a private ownership restriction in their 
assessment of proposed acquisitions in the financial sector. This provides for unequal 
treatment of investors according to whether they are a financial institution or a private 
acquirer. In effect, private acquirers, either individuals or undertakings, are consistently 
denied acquisition in financial institutions of more than 25 percent of the share capital, 
unless they are acquiring a holding in a niche financial institution. This practice is based on 
                                                 
59
 Level-3 Committees (2008) p. 4 
60
 Integrated in the EEA Agreement 4 July 2008 by the EEA Committee‟s resolution no. 79/2008 
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political motivations, first and foremost a wish to control structural conditions in financial 
institutions. The goal is to provide a dispersed ownership structure in institutions in order to 
obtain division of power and to secure the independence of financial institutions from other 
economic interests, especially in consideration of the risks relating to moral hazard and 
conflicts of interest.
61
 This assessment practice is documented in several administrative 
decisions.
62
 In a recent case, although relating to an expansion of the licence of a life 
insurance company to other insurance categories, authorities denied expansion solely on 
the grounds of ownership dispersal.
63
  
 
With the introduction of the QHD the scope of competent authorities‟ discretionary 
assessment became more constricted, however Norwegian authorities have not changed 
their authorisation practice notably. This calls into question the legitimacy of Norwegian 
assessment practices. Against this background we will assess whether Norwegian 
assessment practice is in conflict with the Banking and Insurance Directives as amended by 
the Qualifying Holdings Directive. The essential question is whether the new provisions 
allow Norwegian practice to go unchanged.  
 
4.3 The scope of the provisions 
The domestic rules regulating the notification, assessment and subsequent authorisation of 
proposed acquisitions only apply to „qualifying holdings‟. The FIA section 2-2(1) provides 
that an acquisition of a qualifying holding in financial institutions may only take place after 
notification to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway and in accordance with 
authorisation given pursuant to the rules in Chapter 2. The same applies to acquisitions 
whereby a qualifying holding reaches or exceeds 20, 30 or 50 percent, respectively, of the 
capital or voting rights in the institution, and to any other acquisitions which provide 
controlling influence as mentioned in the Private Limited Companies Act section 1-3 and 
the Public Limited Companies Act section 1-3. It further states that a „qualifying holding‟ 
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means a holding which represents 10 percent or more of the capital or voting rights in a 
financial institution or which makes it possible to exercise significant influence on the 
management of the institution and its business.
64
 This means that acquisitions below these 
thresholds may be acquired without prior notification and without being subjected to prior 
authorisation. These rules are consistent with Article 19 in the Banking Directive and 
Article 15 in the Insurance Directive, as amended.  
 
4.4 Does Norwegian assessment practice conflict with the amended Directives? 
The QHD required changes to the Norwegian prudential assessment legislation and 
commencing 1 July 2009 the Financial Institutions Act was amended to suit the new 
directive provisions in the Banking Directive (BD) Article 19a and Insurance Directive 
(ID) Article 15b. However, the new regulation was not implemented through a direct word 
for word translation; instead the Norwegian legislators prepared their own version of the 
directive provisions to embody the new regulatory requirements.
65
 This is not a problem in 
itself, as Article 7 EEA leaves it up to the Member State to decide on the form of 
implementation, as long as the material aspects of a provision are effectively implemented. 
The new provisions regarding both credit institutions and insurance companies are 
implemented in the Norwegian FIA section 2-4. Still, as FIA section 2-4 is not a mirror 
image of ID Articles 15b and BD 19a, it raises certain difficulties relating to Norwegian 
assessment practice. 
 
To assess whether an unchanged Norwegian prudential assessment practice conflicts with 
the Banking and Insurance Directives after the 2009 revision, we need to determine what 
the Qualifying Holdings Directive demands of domestic assessment practices. In the 
following we will only assess the amendment to the Banking Directive, as the Insurance 
Directive is amended correspondingly. 
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4.4.1 The “fit-and-proper” testing of proposed acquirers 
The new Articles 19a BD and 15b ID introduced by the Qualifying Holdings Directive 
provide clear and detailed criteria for the prudential assessment of proposed acquirers. 
Article 19a(1) BD provides the following: 
 
“In assessing the [proposed acquisition] the competent authorities shall, in order to ensure the sound and 
prudent management of the credit institution in which an acquisition is proposed, and having regard to the 
likely influence of the proposed acquirer on the credit institution, appraise the suitability of the proposed 
acquirer and the financial soundness of the proposed acquisition against all of the following criteria: 
 
(a) the reputation of the proposed acquirer; 
(b) the reputation and experience of any person who will direct the business of the credit institution as a 
result of the proposed acquisition; 
(c) the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, in particular in relation to the type of business 
pursued and envisaged in the credit institution in which the acquisition is proposed; 
(d) whether the credit institution will be able to comply and continue to comply with the prudential 
requirements based on this Directive, and where applicable, other Directives, ..., in particular, 
whether the group of which it will become a part has a structure that makes it possible to exercise 
effective supervision, effectively exchange information among the competent authorities and 
determine the allocation of responsibilities among the competent authorities; 
(e) whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with the proposed acquisition, 
money laundering or terrorist financing within the meaning of Article 1of Directive 2005/60/EC is 
being or has been committed or attempted, or that the proposed acquisition could increase the risk 
thereof.” 
 
Article 19a specifies five criteria that competent authorities have to take into account when 
assessing a proposed acquisition. The text provides that all of these criteria have to be taken 
into consideration in each evaluation. Although new in writing, these are criteria that have 
been relevant for national authorities also under previous assessment practices.
66
 It has 
been debated to which extent these are the only criteria that competent authorities are 
allowed to consider, and the answer to this question is essential to the fate of Norwegian 
assessment practice.  
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Article 19a(1) does not in itself regulate this matter, thus further guidance must be sought 
in other considerations. An essential point is that the QHD is a maximum harmonisation 
Directive, intended to establish harmonised assessment criteria and procedural rules in all 
Member States, against the backdrop of the essential freedom of movement of capital.
67
 In 
general this indicates a narrowing of competent authorities‟ discretionary privileges. 
According to recital 2 the main objective is to establish detailed criteria for a prudential 
assessment of proposed acquisitions and a procedure for their application, which is needed 
in order to provide the necessary legal certainty, clarity and predictability in the assessment 
process.
68
 This supports a limitation to the material scope of national authorities‟ 
competence, however not in clearly defined terms.  
 
The strongest indication that Article 19a provides the only accepted assessment criteria, to 
the detriment of Norwegian practice, is found in the preamble‟s recital 3, which states: 
“The role of the competent authorities in both domestic and cross-border cases should be 
to carry out the prudential assessment within a framework of a clear and transparent 
procedure and a limited set of clear assessment criteria of strictly prudential nature.” The 
referral to a limited set of criteria strongly suggests that only the five criteria in Article 19a 
are relevant, which is also in keeping with the maximum harmonisation of assessment 
practices across the Community. Article 19a(2) points in the same direction, stating that 
competent authorities may only oppose a proposed acquisition if there are “reasonable 
grounds for doing so on the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 1 ..”. The preamble‟s 
recital 9 further supports the argument, as it provides that Member State shall provide a list 
of information that may be requested for the purpose of the assessment, strictly according 
to the criteria set out in the Directive.  
 
The Directive also establishes a prohibition of Member States laying down stricter rules 
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than proscribed in the Directive.
69
 This is stated in the preamble at recital 6, as well as 
amended Articles 19(8) BD and 15a(7) ID. This is a general prohibition, which also applies 
to the criteria in Article 19a, c.f. Article 15b ID. Seeing as additional criteria in an 
assessment process would most likely amount to stricter rules to those being assessed, this 
is another indication that other criteria do not represent legitimate interests in the 
assessment procedure. Additionally, recitals 12 and 13 refer to procedures for future 
adjustments of the assessment criteria in accordance with developments in market 
conditions. This explicit referral to a formal procedure also suggests to a certain degree that 
the assessment criteria may not be supplemented unless officially adopted. On this 
background it seems that the prudential assessment is strictly limited to the criteria set out 
in Article 19a. This would mean that Norwegian authorities are not allowed to consider 
additional criteria such as structural considerations and private ownership limitations.  
 
Because the implementation of the Directive is quite recent, there is no ECJ case law on the 
matter so far. The only rulings relating to the QHD are regarding Member States‟ failure to 
adopt the Directive within the time limit
70
 or failure to adopt all of the regulatory 
changes
71
. 
 
Prior to implementation of the QHD, Norwegian authorities discussed the implications of 
the impending legislative changes. In the initiating preparatory works by the Banking Law 
Commission, it was pointed to different facts indicating that relevant criteria could not 
unconditionally be restricted to those listed in Article 19a(1).
72
 The argument is based on 
Recitals 8 and 9, the former of which facilitates the emphasis on whether the acquirer is an 
unregulated entity in the assessment process and the latter of which states that required 
information should be proportionate and adjusted to the nature of the acquisition, especially 
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if the proposed acquirer is an unregulated entity. However, from their context it seems that 
these considerations are mere elaborations of the rules in Article 19a and do not present 
additional elements to the assessment process.
73
 The preparatory works also point to the 
fact that Banking Directive Article 12(3) contains supervisory rules not embodied within 
the criteria of Article 19a.
74
 This argument is obviously beside the point, as Article 12 
regulates the taking up of the business of credit institutions, which is not affected by the 
QHD. 
 
The follow-up preparatory works by the Ministry of Finance are somewhat ambiguous. 
Introductory they provide that the new rules cause a narrowing of the authorities‟ discretion 
and that although the prudential assessment must be exercised in accordance with “an 
exhaustive list of criteria”, there will still be some room for discretion within the sphere of 
these criteria.
75
 In a subsequent part of its paper, the Ministry claims that the criteria listed 
in Article 19a cannot be considered an exhaustive list of criteria, but that they pose certain 
limits to which other criteria may be assessed. This is not only inconsistent with its initial 
statement but also seemingly in conflict with the explicit intentions of the Directive. It is 
also discrepant from the recommendation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the 
approval of the EEA Committee‟s decision to incorporate the QHD in the EEA Agreement. 
In its recommendation the Ministry states that the QHD provides an exhaustive list of 
assessment criteria, but that the criteria themselves open for some degree of discretion.
76
 As 
there are presented no durable arguments to support an assessment more detached from 
directive requirements, it seems rather unlikely that the QHD grants competent authorities 
such opportunities. 
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4.4.2 Guidelines for the prudential assessment of proposed acquisitions 
The guidelines developed by the Level-3 Committees for the prudential assessment of 
acquisitions and increase of holdings in the financial sector required by the QHD do not 
outright discuss the issue of additional assessment criteria, but the introductory statement 
supports a strict interpretation of the QHD amendments. The guidelines highlight the 
introduction of identical evaluation criteria in all Member States. They also identify the 
main objectives of the QHD as specifying clear criteria of a strictly prudential nature to be 
applied by all competent authorities.
77
 This is in line with Recital 3 of the QHD. 
Furthermore it is pointed out that the Directive is based on the principle of maximum 
harmonisation throughout the European Community, effecting identical provisions in all of 
the three covered financial sectors.
78
 On the basis of a promotion of convergence in 
supervisory practices, the Level-3 Committees identify one of their main goals in the 
guidelines as reaching “a common understanding of the five assessment criteria laid down 
by the Directive, as a prerequisite for convergent supervisory practices”.79 It is followed 
by a thorough examination of each of the five criteria. The total absence of other 
considerations suggests that the Level-3 Committees have viewed the criteria laid down by 
the Directive as exhaustive. 
 
Additionally, a broad interpretation of the QHD gives rise to other inconsistencies; an 
assessment practice more restrictive than provided for by the QHD will cause problems in 
relation to a proposed acquirer who is already acknowledged in another Member State. 
Namely, under the analysis of the first assessment criterion the Level-3 Committees note 
that “the integrity requirements should generally be presumed to have been met if the 
acquirer is a natural or legal person already considered to be „of good repute‟ in his 
capacity as a significant shareholder of another financial institution which is supervised by 
the same competent supervisor or by another competent supervisor in the same country or 
in another Member State”.80 It would not promote a harmonised assessment practice if 
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other criteria were to interfere with the explicit presuppositions of the Committees. 
 
4.4.3 Limits of circumvention 
The line between EEA imposed legislation and national authority is in any case difficult to 
draw. The Banking Law Committee holds that competent authorities will always have the 
right and duty to assess the provided information according to criteria and considerations 
that they would normally take into account to secure the sounds and prudent management 
of a financial institution.
81
 Naturally we can‟t exclude the possibility that competent 
authorities on occasion may need to assess a proposed acquisition more freely depending 
on the information provided by the acquirer. However, this should not present an 
opportunity for competent authorities to sneak in other motives that they deem important. It 
seems natural that the line must be drawn at considerations which are not connected to a 
typical “sound-and-prudent” assessment but appear to be of a different nature, such as 
considerations relating to the ownership structure of financial institutions and distinction of 
shareholders based on their institutional or non-institutional characteristics.  
 
Under the last adaption to EEA rules in 2004 when the 10 percent ownership restriction 
was deleted from the FIA and ownership control rules were introduced, the Norwegian 
authorities held that there was no need to keep in place a rule in the CBA requiring a 
minimum of ten founders. The reasoning was that the motives behind this rule could be 
secured through the new ownership control rules.
82
 With the introduction of detailed 
assessment criteria in 2009, this can no longer be the case. Thus, based on the discussion 
above there are strong indications that Norwegian authorities‟ assessment practice is in 
conflict with EEA secondary legislation and needs to undergo a formal change to properly 
adapt to the new requirements. 
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5 The taking up of the business of credit institutions and insurance 
companies in Norway 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss the legitimacy of the competent authorities‟ authorisation 
practice for establishment of financial institutions and explore the potential conflict 
between the Norwegian three-quarters public offering rule and Norway‟s obligations under 
the EEA Agreement. None of these issues have so far been raised from political or 
authoritative circles. However, taking into account that both rest on the same political 
motivations as the assessment practice relating to subsequent proposed acquisitions, there 
is reason to believe that private investors will challenge both practice and legislation as 
competent authorities continue to restrict the size of private acquisitions in financial 
institutions. Initially we will review the rules on prudential assessment and public offering 
as part of authorisation practice. 
 
5.1.1 Prudential assessment as part of the authorisation process 
The domestic rules on authorisation of banks and insurance companies are found in the 
Commercial Banks Act (CBA) and the Insurance Act (IA) respectively. They implement 
the relevant provisions of the Banking Directive and the Insurance Directive in domestic 
law. 
 
The CBA is restricted to commercial banks, which are defined as “... all institutions which 
fund their activity by accepting deposits from an unrestricted range of depositors.”83 The 
IA applies to both insurance companies and pension funds, including activity by such 
companies.
84
 Due to the different nature of insurance classes available, section 1-3 provides 
for a legal separation of insurance classes. Commercial banks may only be formed as 
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private limited companies or public limited companies, while insurance companies 
additionally may be formed as mutual companies.
85
  
 
As a prerequisite, institutions may not carry on banking or insurance activity without prior 
authorisation by the King
86
, whose authority is delegated to the Ministry of Finance
87
 and 
further delegated to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (“Finanstilsynet”). As 
part of the authorisation process, the FSA needs to perform a prudential assessment of the 
institutions relating to their capital adequacy and the soundness of persons critical to the 
business. The prudential assessment criteria are equally designed in CBA section 8a(2) and 
IA section 2-1(2). Section 8a(2) is worded accordingly:  
 
“Authorisation pursuant to section 8, first and second paragraphs, shall be refused if the bank fails to comply 
with the provisions of this Act, if the bank‟s capital is not deemed to be in reasonable proportion to the 
business the bank intends to carry on, or if the board members, managing director or other person directly in 
charge of the business: 
 
1. cannot be deemed to have the experience necessary to fill the post of the office, 
2. has been convicted of a criminal offence, and the offence committed gives reason to assume that the 
person in question would not discharge the position or the post in a satisfactory manner, or 
3. in his post or in the performance of other office has displayed conduct that gives reason to assume 
that the person in question would not discharge the position in a satisfactory manner.”88 
 
In 2003 a third paragraph was added to Section 8a, stating that authorisation shall be 
refused unless the King is convinced that owners of qualifying holdings are suited to own 
such holdings and to exercise such influence in the bank as their holdings give rise to, c.f. 
IA section 2-1(1).
 89
 The term “qualifying holding” confers to the use of the same term in 
the FIA, Section 2-2, as explained in chapter 4.  
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5.1.2 The statutory foundation of the “Principle of Dispersed Ownership”  
In regards to ownership control at the time of establishment of a financial institution, the 
“principle of dispersed ownership” is not only a principle, but actually expressed directly 
through statutory law in both the Commercial Banks Act and the Insurance Act. The CBA 
section 4(1) second sentence is worded accordingly: 
 
“Authorisation under section 8 of this Act shall be refused unless more than three-quarters 
of the commercial bank‟s share capital is subscribed in connection with a capital increase 
effected without any pre-emption rights for shareholders and others.”90 
 
The IA section 2-1(1) final sentence is worded correspondingly.
91
 Basically, this rule 
presents a 24.99 percent limitation on ownership in regard to any investor, but in certain 
cases the authorities exempt applications from the three-quarters public offering rule if they 
only pertain the taking up of a niche business within banking or insurance.
92
 More 
importantly, authorities often exempt financial institutions from these rules, allowing them 
to own as much as 100 percent of another financial institution.
93
 The practice is based on an 
evaluation of the business‟ relative importance within the sector.94 
 
Literature on the coming into existence of the public offering rule is sparse. Before 2004 
the CBA contained a rule only proscribing public offering without a quantitative 
requirement, while the IA had no such rule. Simultaneously with the abolishment of the 10 
percent ownership restrictions in the FIA, the above-cited rule was written into both Acts.
95
  
 
The close link between the apparent loosening of the ownership restriction rules into 
ownership control rules and the related introduction of the three-quarters public offering 
rules indicates a common set of political justifications for their content and existence. The 
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preparatory works to the regulatory changes in 2004 state that the rules regarding 
ownership restrictions and the establishment of commercial banks have to be viewed 
collectively, because both set of rules are motivated by the main goals of achieving division 
of power and the need to secure independent institutions.
96
 Additionally, the follow-up 
preparatory works leading up to the subsequent regulatory changes underline that the rules 
on public offering are meant to secure that a financial institution is subject to dispersed 
ownership from the outset.
97
  
 
5.2 Does Norwegian authorisation practice conflict with the Directives? 
The rules in the Commercial Banks Act and the Insurance Act proscribing public offering 
of shares and the rules regarding the prudential assessment of owners refer to slightly 
different aspects of the initial evaluation in the authorisation process. While the three-
quarters rule is stated as a formal requirement for authorisation, the latter demands a 
discretionary evaluation. However, these rules are closely linked through the competent 
authorities‟ authorisation practice. 
 
The motivations behind the three-quarters public offering rules are a great influence on the 
authorities‟ sound and prudent assessment of owners, and have over time resulted in a 
24.99 percent or lower ownership restriction threshold for private non-financial initial 
founders, similar to the practice for subsequent proposed acquisitions.
98
 This is in spite of 
the fact that a private owner would be considered “sound and prudent” to own more than 
the relevant percentage of the institution if the prudential assessment criteria were practiced 
on their own.  
 
Exceptions are made for niche businesses, on the grounds that they do not play an equally 
important role within industrial and credit policy. This means that individuals or non-
financial institutions that want to start up a new business with niche characteristics within 
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banking or insurance avoid forced changes to their ownership structure through “dispersal 
sales”, resulting in holdings above 25 percent in the niche business.99 
 
Neither the Banking Directive nor the Insurance Directive contain rules equivalent to the 
Commercial Banks Act Section 4 and the Insurance Act Section 2-1.  
 
5.2.1 Interpretive presuppositions  
When analysing a directive, the method of interpretation is similar to Norwegian 
interpretation practice.
100
 The natural point of departure is the text itself, including its 
wording and context. Additionally, the main purpose of the directive as expressed through 
its text is of great importance.
101
 However, the Preamble of a directive cannot always be 
cohesively interpreted in EU and EEA law, as the Preamble is written in consideration of 
the EU cooperation and not adjusted for the EEA. The interpretive significance of the 
Preamble is regulated in the EEA Agreement‟s Protocol 1, Section 1, which states: “[The 
preambles] are relevant to the extent necessary for the proper interpretation and 
application, within the framework of the Agreement, of the provisions contained in such 
acts.” We will observe these guidelines in the following. However, due to the lack of 
supporting authoritative texts to the specific directive provisions, emphasis is put on the 
Directive‟s text, its purpose and the motives stated in the Preamble. In the following we 
focus on the Banking Directive, as the Insurance Directive contains largely corresponding 
regulation. 
 
5.2.2 Minimum harmonisation in the Banking Directive 
The provisions regarding requirements for access to the taking up of the business of credit 
institutions are found in Articles 6 to 18 of the Banking Directive. In terms of ownership 
control regulation Articles 6, 8, 11 and 12 are central. 
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Article 6 delegates to the Member State the responsibility of laying down the requirements 
for obtaining authorisation within its jurisdiction. This appears to be a fairly liberal 
regulation, providing Norwegian Authorities with broad discretion to decide which 
requirements must be met in order to obtain a licence. However, it is cohesive with the 
wide powers awarded to the Home Member State and the general implications of a 
minimum harmonisation directive. As a point of departure, this could indicate a freedom to 
decide whether a certain ownership threshold must be met for an authorisation to go 
through. However, Article 6 only provides a general indication of a Member State‟s 
freedom, in as far as it must be read “without prejudice to Articles 7 to 12”102, which 
provide further guidance on the obligations of the Member State. 
 
Article 12 describes the prudential assessment of shareholders or members prior to 
authorisation. It is the only provision regulating the initial assessment of owners necessary 
to decide for or against authorisation of a credit institution. Therefore, it provides the 
foundation for what a Member State is obliged to consider, focusing on sufficient 
information, sound and prudent shareholders and effective supervision. Article 11 is of less 
importance in this aspect, as it regulates the prudential assessment of persons who will 
direct the business. Article 12 paragraphs 1(1), 2 and 3(1) are reproduced below: 
 
1. The competent authorities shall not grant authorisation for the taking-up of the business of credit 
institutions unless they have been informed of the identities of the shareholders or members, whether 
direct or indirect, natural or legal persons, that have qualifying holdings, and of the amounts of 
those holdings. 
 
2. The competent authorities shall not grant authorisation if, taking into account the need to ensure the 
sound and prudent management of a credit institution, they are not satisfied as to the suitability of 
the shareholders or members. 
 
3. Where close links exist between the credit institution and other natural or legal persons, the 
competent authorities shall grant authorisation only if those links do not prevent the effective 
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exercise of their supervisory functions. 
 
 
Although Article 12 clearly states what Member States must consider, it is not clear to 
which degree it provides restrictions on what Member State are allowed to consider. 
Observing the characteristic assessment obligations imposed by Article 12, the important 
question is whether or not Article 12 at all can be said to regulate the question of the 
legality of the Norwegian assessment practice, which is of a differnt nature than a pure “fit-
and-proper” assessment. 
 
The text of Article 12 is not sufficient to answer this question, as it appears to give no 
indication as to the legal status of criteria not naturally included in a “fit-and-proper” 
assessment of a shareholder. Although this might be an indication in itself, we need to look 
to other factors of interpretation complementing the wording of Article 12. 
 
The Preamble‟s recital 15 is important in this respect, stating that “The Member States may 
also establish stricter rules than those laid down in Article ... 12, ... for credit institutions 
authorised by their competent authorities.” The term “stricter rules” must be taken also to 
include domestic administrative practices. In conformity with the above, there is a 
justifiable need for the use of the Preamble in this situation.  
 
We need to focus on the term “stricter rules” in recital 15 combined with the content of 
Article 12. As seen from the reproduction of Article 12 above, this provision focuses on 
sufficiently prudential assessments of the owners of a financial institution, assuring that 
they are “fit and proper” to own a financial institution.103 This goes hand in hand with the 
acquiring of sufficient information in paragraph 1 and effective supervision in paragraph 3. 
Thus, the obligations imposed on Norwegian authorities through Article 12 are restricted to 
assessments closely linked to the suitability of shareholders, and it does not contain any 
indication of the status of authorisation criteria falling outside this limited scope of criteria.  
                                                 
103
 Art 12(2) 
  31 
 
Accordingly, we need to examine whether or not the domestic practice constitutes such 
“stricter rules” that can be introduced by Member States through Article 12, c.f. recital 15. 
From one point of view, with Article 12 being the only provision regulating the initial 
assessment process, recital 15 opens for a variety of stricter national rules as part of the 
authorisation process. Additionally, the domestic assessment practice rule must in itself be 
said to provide “stricter rules”, because it imposes additional requirements on shareholders 
in the establishment process of a credit institution. These facts support the argument that 
the domestic rules fall within the ambit of Article 12 and are accepted in conformity with 
recital 15. We should also take into account the fact that there is no provision directly 
forbidding this type of national regulation. However the argument is not strong, 
considering that directives usually are limited to provisions proscribing what a Member 
State has to do, and rarely what it shall not do.
104
 
 
On the other hand, attention should be paid to the essence of Article 12 as a whole. The fact 
that the Article is so narrowly composed as to its content, draws into question the extent of 
its application. Although recital 15 opens up for “stricter rules”, it seems more suitable to 
apply a sober approach as to its meaning. Recital 15 combined with the content of Article 
12 suggests that the “stricter rules” have to be along the lines of the already existing ones in 
Article 12, e.g. by requiring information also about shareholders with non-qualifying 
holdings or by requiring that competent authorities should be convinced as to a 
shareholders suitability instead of only “satisfied”.  
 
In all, the implications of recital 15 are far from clear. Sadly, there is not much guidance to 
be drawn from the preparatory works to the Directive, mainly because the rules regarding 
the assessment for the taking-up of the business of credit institutions are considered rather 
uncontroversial. Neither the Commission and Council‟s initial legislative document105 nor 
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the Commission Staff Working Paper
106
 or the European Economic and Social 
Committee‟s Opinion107 to the Banking Directive even discuss the provisions of Articles 6-
12.  
 
Taking the more cautious interpretative approach, it seems plausible that Article 12 in 
combination with recital 15 does not regulate the type of rules as expressed through the 
Norwegian assessment practice. The additional peculiarity of the Norwegian public 
offering rules standing unmatched in other European countries further supports this 
argument.
108
 Taking into account that the Directive was originally given for the purpose of 
the EU cooperation, it becomes even more uncontroversial to dismiss the application of 
Article 12 in this respect. 
 
This leads us back to Article 6. Even though the type of ownership practice enforced by 
Norwegian authorities was not necessary captured in the minds of the EC legislators, the 
rules it creates are captured within the wording of Article 6, as they provide “requirements 
for such authorisation”. As seemingly there is no prejudice to Article 12, Article 6 should 
allow Norwegian Authorities to lay down an ownership criterion for the granting of 
authorisation. In this respect we especially need to remember that the Banking Directive is 
a minimum harmonisation directive, leaving a high degree of jurisdiction to the Member 
States. This is highlighted by the European Commission in its Communication on Intra-EU 
investment in the financial services‟ sector.109 The Commission expresses that the directive 
establishes some core principles of supervision, like the “fit and proper” requirement, to 
obtain probity and soundness in financial institutions.
110
 This is followed by the 
acknowledgement that this secondary legislation has yet to go beyond a certain level of 
harmonisation of its specific provisions, which “enables Member States to apply 
supplementary rules and administrative practices to the common rules set down in the EU 
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directives”.111 Thus, the Commission straight-out confirms the powers of Member States 
under the Directive. 
 
5.2.2.1 The ban on considering the economic needs of the market 
However, Article 8 may impede the simple Application of Article 6, stating: “Member 
States may not require the application for authorisation to be examined in terms of the 
economic needs of the market”. This term is broad and it is not clear which specific 
motivations it covers. Thus, decisive is to which extent the Norwegian practice is motivated 
by the “economic needs of the market”. According to the Banking Law Commission, the 
term will generally encompass cases where a licence is denied on grounds that market 
conditions do not welcome new market players.
112
 As specified above under 5.2., the main 
goals behind the practice are to ensure a dispersed ownership structure and to secure 
independent institutions. These motivations do not seem to fall within the ambit of 
“economic needs of the market”. 
 
More generally, ECJ case law indicates that domestic legislation that conflicts with a ban 
on considering economic needs of the market often directly states that such considerations 
should be made. See to this effect Commission v French Republic, where the Court simply 
states that “national legislation which makes the grant of a licence to pursue an activity 
such as the engagement of performing artists subject to the need to engage performing 
artists constitutes a restriction in that it tends to limit the number of suppliers of services” 
(our underlining).
113
 
 
The Norwegian assessment practice does not point to any such considerations, but simply 
effects an ownership criterion for licensing. This view seems to be mirrored in the Ministry 
of Finance‟s evaluation of the necessary changes to the Financial Institutions Act under the 
QHD. The Ministry stated that a domestic rule proscribing evaluation of competition policy 
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and other market conditions needed to be amended due to Article 19a of the Directive, 
forbidding Member States to consider “the economic needs of the market”.114 It seems 
there is a prevailing opinion, both nationally and on an EC level, that a provision or 
practice needs to directly refer to market needs in order to conflict with such a prohibition. 
Therefore, the Norwegian assessment practice most likely does not constitute the type of 
domestic regulation that would be in direct conflict with Article 8 of the Directive. 
Observing Article 6, this indicates that the Norwegian practice presumably is not in conflict 
with the provisions of the Banking Directive.  
 
5.2.2.2 The freedom limitations 
However, in spite of the straight-forward wording of Article 6, it is not likely to give 
Member States the full freedom to lay down stricter rules, by only requiring that they do 
not conflict with Articles 7-12 of the current Directive. For a complete interpretation, the 
expressed purpose of the Directive has to be taken into account. 
 
The main purpose of the Banking Directive is stated in recital 3 in the Preamble, which is 
“the achievement of the internal market from the point of view of both the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide financial services, in the field of credit 
institutions”. As further stated in recital 3, the Directive constitutes the essential instrument 
to achieving this goal, indicating that the provisions of the Directive itself are meant to be 
sufficient within their respective field. However, a directive that seeks to implement any of 
the fundamental freedoms in domestic law needs to be interpreted in the light of the 
respective Agreement provisions.
115
 Thus, Articles 31 and 36 EEA should provide 
guidelines for the interpretation of the Banking Directive. This means that the directive to 
the farthest extent possible needs to be interpreted in accordance with the EEA Agreement, 
in conformity with the principle of homogeneity and cohesive interpretation of EU and 
EEA law.
116
 There is a clear tendency in ECJ case law towards broad interpretations of 
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directives, often laying aside the distinct wording of the directive and focusing on the 
compliance with the EC Treaty and its own case law.
117
 However, this changes the initial 
question slightly, turning it into a question regarding EEA Agreement compliance and not 
directive compliance, although these often can be considered different sides to the same 
matter. EEA Agreement compliance will be addressed in chapter 5.3. 
 
As far as the Directives go, there is reason to believe that Norwegian authorisation practice 
is in conformity with the Directive provisions. Firstly, we point to the explicit statements in 
the European Commission‟s Communication. Secondly, the Directives only seek minimum 
harmonisation.
118
 This means that Member States can provide for regulation and 
administrative procedures not covered by the directive, and that domestic law which 
extends beyond the provisions of a directive (or even confer to it) need to be tried in the 
same way as other domestic legislation directly against the Agreement provisions in a 
question regarding compliance with any of the freedoms. 
 
As we conclude that Norwegian authorisation practice is not in direct conflict with the 
Insurance and Banking Directives, and as we presume that the Directives themselves are 
not in conflict with the EEA Agreement, there is no room for further pursuing the question 
of whether domestic practice conflicts directly with the Agreement. However, the 
Norwegian authorisation practice rests on the same political motivations as the Norwegian 
public offering rules, as they are deeply intertwined. Discussing the potential conflict 
between these rules and the EEA Agreement in chapter 5.4. might provide further guidance 
as to the legal status of authorisation practice as well, as seen from an EEA supervisory 
point of view. Before getting to this, we will discuss whether the QHD has any effect on 
our preliminary conclusion. 
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5.2.3 The relevance of the Qualifying Holdings Directive 
The Qualifying Holdings Directive amends both the Banking Directive and the Insurance 
Directive. However it only amends the rules relating to the pursuit of investments in credit 
institutions and insurance companies and does not affect the Directives‟ provisions 
regarding the initial taking up of these businesses.
119
 In this respect, the question remains as 
to whether or not the QHD has any relevance to the Norwegian practice regarding the 
initial assessment of shareholders as part of the authorisation process.  
 
We recall that one of the main differences between the QHD on the one hand and the 
Banking and Insurance Directives on the other, is the degree of harmonisation sought by 
the directives. The former is a maximum harmonisation directive, while the two latter are 
minimum harmonisation directives. This means that if the QHD is of any relevance to the 
taking up of the business of credit institutions and insurance companies, it will put greater 
restraints on the authorities‟ discretionary assessment. Furthermore, it might render the 
authorities‟ practice incompatible with Norway‟s obligations pursuant to the EEA 
Agreement in spite of our preliminary conclusion above. 
 
As an initial point of departure, we can hold with confidence that the QHD does not 
formally affect the Norwegian authorisation process. This is naturally so because the 
directive itself does not make changes in the provisions regarding the authorisation process 
and prudential assessment of initial shareholders. In theory, there should be nothing wrong 
with sticking to this interpretation.  
 
The QHD forced regulatory changes upon Norwegian authorities. The preparatory works 
preceding these changes do not discuss the possible effect that the Directive could have on 
the authorisation process. Up until that time the evaluation criteria had been identical in the 
different stages, which was visible through the explicit reference to the ownership control 
rules in the Financial Institutions Act, in both the Commercial Banks Act and the Insurance 
Activity Act. The Banking Law Commission‟s proposal for regulatory changes simply 
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acknowledges that the implementation of the QHD represents a separation of these rules.
120
 
The only changes proposed to the CBA and the IA were to repeal the linkage to the 
assessment criteria in the FIA.
121
 The subsequent evaluation by the Ministry of Finance 
only repeats the Commission‟s statement without further discussion.122 From this 
legislative history it is obvious that the Norwegian authorities (1) focused on the fact that 
the Directive did not require changes to the authorisation and initial evaluation process, and 
(2) seemingly did not find it problematic that this would lead to a separation of the rules. 
Their behaviour is consistent with the obligations imposed by the directive. 
 
However, if acknowledging this point of view, one might question the resulting 
inconsistence between the authorities‟ practice at different stages throughout a financial 
institution‟s lifetime. It would mean that they would be allowed greater discretion at the 
licensing stage than in the subsequent sound and prudent-assessments of potential 
acquirers. In particular, competent authorities‟ would be allowed to emphasize motives like 
dispersed ownership, structural considerations and competition aspects as part of the initial 
assessments of shareholders, but not in the subsequent assessments of shareholders wanting 
to acquire a holding in a financial institution. At first glance this approach seems 
unfounded, especially taking into account that the time period between an initial 
assessment and a following assessment of a proposed acquirer can be very short.
123
 
 
This leads us to the question of why the QHD only addresses the prudential assessment 
associated with acquisitions and increases in holdings. The answer lies in the reason why 
an amendment was proposed in the first place. Around 2004 the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (ECOFIN) became aware that the number of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking sector were lagging behind other (non-financial) sectors and 
encouraged the European Commission to explore possible obstacles.
124
 This resulted in the 
review of the Banking Directive‟s provisions that allow Member States to oppose 
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acquisitions or increases of qualified holdings in credit institutions based on prudential 
considerations, leading to the adoption of the QHD. Simultaneously the decision was made 
to equally review the corresponding regulations within the securities and insurance 
sectors.
125
 Thus, the motivation behind the amendments did not require an additional 
review of the assessment process relating to the taking up of the business of financial 
institutions and there was no intention to do so. 
 
Against this background, it is difficult to find good reasons as to why the QHD should be 
relevant to the initial assessment process of Norwegian authorities. One reason might be to 
straighten out an inconsistent assessment practice, which of course has an intrinsic value. 
Also, an inconsistent practice might lead to unjustified restraints, considering that one 
acquirer might be treated differently in an initial evaluation process than in a subsequent 
evaluation process, limiting his choice of investments.  
 
However, an inconsistence in domestic practice cannot in itself be enough to impose 
stricter requirements on the authorities‟ assessment as long as the QHD does not formally 
address this assessment. One of the particular concerns of the QHD is to avoid that 
regulatory arbitrage enables individuals and institutions to avoid initial authorisation 
criteria by instead acquiring a holding in a financial institution.
126
 This implies that the 
prudential assessment of a proposed acquisition should not differ greatly from the 
authorisation rules, but it tells nothing specific about the contents of the authorisation rules 
themselves. Additionally, although supporting the existence of an inconsistent practice, we 
might argue that the goals of transparency, legal certainty and harmonisation of domestic 
practice are secured, because authorities still need to abide by QHD provisions when 
assessing a subsequent acquisition proposal. From a slightly different point of view, 
commentators have also raised the question of whether a forced parallelism of the rules is 
at all justified, pointing out that the authorisation rules and rules regarding an acquisition or 
increase of shareholding do not necessary need to follow the same pattern and that it would 
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be legitimate to subject a subsequent acquisition to less stringent constraints than an initial 
authorisation.
127
 These considerations support the division of rules as perceived by the 
Norwegian authorities. 
 
Considering the above we stand by the conclusion that the authorities‟ licensing practice is 
not in conflict with the Banking Directive or the Insurance Directive.  
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5.3 Exploring the potential conflict between the Norwegian public offering rules 
and the EEA Agreement 
 
The European Commission has expressed that “when national rules are more restrictive 
than EU secondary legislation, conflicts with the Treaty freedoms may appear. When 
legislating or creating or enforcing administrative practices, Member States must respect 
both, the basic freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty in addition to ensuring compliance 
with the directive.”128 
 
On this background, we will discuss the potential conflict between the Norwegian three-
quarters public offering requirements for financial institutions and the obligations imposed 
by the EEA Agreement. We remind the reader that these rules apply to all investors, private 
or not, unless exceptions are made. Issues arising from these rules have so far been 
addressed neither by national authorities nor EEA supervisory authorities. Accordingly, we 
attempt to provide a preliminary evaluation as to the legitimacy of the Norwegian public 
offering rules. The essential question is whether or not the rules constitute restrictions on 
any of the essential freedoms in the EEA Agreement. 
 
5.3.1 Right of establishment and free movement of capital connected to intra-EEA 
investments 
The provisions regarding right of establishment and free movement of capital are the two 
main sets of rules that regulate the intra-EEA investment in the financial sector.
129
 The 
Banking Directive and the Insurance Directive mention the freedom to provide services as 
a main goal next to the right of establishment.
130
 The distinction between the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services it not always clear, which is discussed in 
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a quantity of ECJ case law.
131
 However, these are issues of main concern to the institutions 
actually providing the services. For the purpose intra-EU investments in financial 
institutions, either by individuals or undertakings, the right of establishment is the main 
focus. On the other hand, none of the directives mention the free movement of capital as a 
goal in itself. However, the free movement of capital is necessarily closely linked to the 
freedom of establishment in the case of intra-EEA investments, in as far as any investor 
will need to move capital in order to make any kind of investment. The complex 
relationship and certain overlap between the two freedoms has on several occasions driven 
the ECJ to choose between a cumulative or alternative application of the freedoms.
132
 
 
As for establishment, this chapter only addresses the issue of primary establishment, which 
entails the primary establishment of a financial institution in a Member State or the 
relocation of the entire business to such a State. The issue of secondary establishment 
applies to the establishment of branches or subsidiaries in another Member State than the 
home Member State, which is where the “home country control principle” primarily is 
relevant. Secondary establishment in Norway is regulated by administrative regulation.
133
  
 
5.3.1.1 Right of establishment 
The right of establishment is regulated in Articles 31 to 34 EEA.
134
 Article 31 provides 
that: “Within the framework of the provisions of this Agreement, there shall be no 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of an EC Member State or EFTA 
State in the territory of any other of these States.”135 
 
 It further states that: “Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and 
pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in 
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particular companies or firms ... under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by 
the law of the country where such establishment is effected...”136  
 
Article 34 provides that companies or firms shall be treated in the same way as natural 
persons who are nationals of the EC Member States or EFTA States, if they are formed in 
accordance with the law of any of these States and have their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business within the territory of any of these States.
137
 
“Companies or firms” means companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial 
law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private 
law, save for those that are non-profit-making.
138
 
 
5.3.1.2 Free movement of capital 
The rules in the EEA Agreement regarding the free movement of capital mirror those of the 
EC Treaty prior to the changes effected by the Maastricht Treaty. This means that the 
regulation of capital movements is not identical in EEA and EU law, but the EC Court has 
pronounced that the materiel content of the rules is in fact the same.
139
 For the purpose of 
the EEA cooperation the rules regarding capital movements are provided in the EEA 
Agreement Articles 40 to 45
140
 and Directive 88/361/EEC (“Capital Movements Directive” 
(CMD))
141
. 
 
Article 40 EEA is the main article and states that: “Within the framework of the provisions 
of this Agreement, there shall be no restrictions between the Contracting Parties on the 
movement of capital belonging to persons resident in EC Member States or EFTA States 
and no discrimination based on the nationality or on the place of residence of the parties 
or on the place where such capital is invested.” 
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Additionally, Article 1 first sentence of the CMD states that: “Without prejudice to the 
following provisions, Member States shall abolish restrictions on movements of capital 
taking place between persons resident in Member States.” The ECJ has confirmed that this 
provision establishes a prohibition against restrictions on capital movements.
142
 
 
The term „capital movement‟ is not defined in the EEA Agreement but it has traditionally 
been interpreted to entail a unilateral value transfer between two States, effecting a 
separation between capital movements and payments, the latter of which is regulated in 
Article 41 EEA.
143
 However, according to ECJ case law a transfer of equity shares and 
other financial instruments issued by a company are considered capital movements and 
covered by Article 40.
144
 
145
 
 
5.3.2 A cumulative or alternative application of the two freedoms 
Before discussing whether or not the public offering rules constitute restrictions, and thus 
possibly a conflict with EEA law, we will examine which of the two freedoms is applicable 
in this situation. This is a difficult distinction to draw in the case of cross-border 
investments. 
 
In the case Holböck the ECJ stated: “As regards the question whether national legislation 
falls within the scope of one or other of the freedoms of movement, it is clear from what is 
now well established case-law that the purpose of the legislation concerned must be taken 
into consideration.”146 Similar statements appear in a list of other judgments.147 To this 
effect Advocate General Kokott expressed in the case Geurts and Vogten that “only the 
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fundamental freedom which is the main focus as regards the substance of the matter should 
be applied”.148 In several cases the Court has used this procedure to decide between an 
application of right of establishment and movement of capital, or whether to apply both 
freedoms. Thus, when evaluating which freedom will be applicable to the Norwegian 
public offering rules, we need to establish the main purpose of this legislation. As we have 
explained in chapter 5.2. above, the main goals behind these rules are to achieve division of 
power through a dispersed ownership structure and to secure independent institutions. In 
itself this does not provide much guidance as to whether right of establishment or 
movement of capital is the main focus. But knowing that the rules are directed at the initial 
establishment process of a financial institution by laying down an ownership criterion 
provides a sound indication that the rules at least fall within the scope of „right of 
establishment‟. 
 
On the other hand, if we look to the explicit wording of the rules, the purpose is clearly to 
control the number of owners of the institution, by imposing a requirement of a more than 
three-quarters public offering of shares. This rule limits the total amount of shares that may 
be held and thus the amount of capital that may be invested. Therefore, the rules also reside 
within the ambit of „movement of capital‟. The closest we get to relevant case law 
comparable to these rules are the famous „golden shares‟ cases.149 „Golden shares‟ is a term 
used to describe shares that grant state control in privatised companies by enabling 
government authorities to intervene in their share structure or management in various 
ways.
150
 Case law shows that these state prerogatives are mainly proscribed by legislation 
and more seldom established by the company itself. The ECJ has expressed that the free 
movement of capital is the „main focus‟ of the „golden shares‟ rules.151 Although the 
Norwegian rules are not a result of state ownership in financial institutions, they have some 
similarities with the „golden shares‟ cases in as far as they provide the authorities with the 
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right to refuse an investment above a certain percentage. This suggests that movement of 
capital is an important aspect of the rules, but in lack of any case law discussing rules with 
closer similarity to the Norwegian rules, it is not enough to tip the scale in favour of 
movement of capital as a main focus.  
 
Clearly, any form of establishment also requires the movement of capital. Accordingly it is 
difficult to decide on either right of establishment or movement of capital in this case only 
by application of the „main focus‟ test. 
 
Thus, The ECJ has gone further in establishing criteria for the distinction between the two 
freedoms in the case of investments. The Court has declared that capital movements 
include both direct investments and portfolio investments.
152
 To ascertain whether we are 
talking about “establishment” or an “investment”, the Court makes use of a criterion of 
“definite influence”. A typical example is the Baars case, where the Court expressed that 
“a national of a Member State who has a holding in the capital of a company established 
in another Member State which gives him definite influence over the company‟s decisions 
and allows him to determine its activities is exercising his right of establishment”.153 The 
Court further states that “control or management of the company, ... are factors connected 
with the exercise of the right of establishment”.154 This means that an ownership stake 
below this threshold falls within the movement of capital. In determining whether or not 
such definite influence is present in an individual case, the rules of company law in the 
State in which the company is established should be taken into account.
155
 To this effect, 
guidance can be sought in the Norwegian Private Limited Companies Act section 1-3 and 
the Public Limited Companies Act 1-3. 
 
Some guidance can also be drawn from a connected field. In a reasoned opinion to Norway 
dated December 2010, the EFTA Surveillance Authority deemed Norwegian legislation on 
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ownership in financial services and infrastructure institutions to be in conflict with both 
Article 31 and 40 EEA. The Surveillance Authority held, as relevant in that case, that 
shareholdings above 20 percent normally fall within the scope of Article 31, but that in 
certain cases 20 percent ownership might not give the owner „definite influence‟ in the 
company, depending on the ownership structure.
156
  
 
The Norwegian rules on public offering of shares are similar to those discussed in the 
Reasoned Opinion in as far as they lay down a fixed fraction of property rights that cannot 
be exceeded. The difference is that they only regulate the initial establishment of the 
institution and that the threshold is slightly higher. As the rules proscribe public offering of 
more than three-quarters of the shares, it entails in theory that one single founder may own 
as much as 24.99 percent of the total equity in the institution. We cannot exclude that also a 
24.99 percent ownership in some cases could be insufficient to amount to „definite 
influence‟. This is supported by the ECJ‟s ruling in the case Commission v Italy, where it 
states that “[n]ational legislation ... which applies irrespective of the size of the holding 
which the shareholder has in a company may fall within the ambit of both Article 43 EC 
and Article 56 EC”.157 Therefore we need to examine both freedoms when assessing a 
potential conflict with the EEA Agreement.          
 
5.3.3 Do the Norwegian rules constitute ownership restrictions in conflict with 
Articles 31 and 40 EEA? 
The fundamental principles of right of establishment and movement of capital entail a 
general prohibition on restrictions. This is expressed in Articles 31 and 40 EEA, Article 1 
of the CMD as well as through a long line of ECJ case law.
158
 In the Court‟s early case law 
it ruled that only unequal treatment in the access to markets because of nationality 
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amounted to unlawful restrictions on the freedoms.
 159
 The Norwegian rules on public 
offering do not discriminate on such grounds, as they apply to domestic as well as foreign 
investors. In more recent case law unequal treatment is not necessary for a domestic rule to 
constitute a restriction.
160
 
 
As regards freedom of establishment, the Court holds that “all measures which prohibit, 
impede or render less attractive the exercise of that freedom must be regarded as 
constituting ... restrictions”.161  In the case of movement of capital, the Court has expressed 
itself a bit differently, by stating that “national measures must be regarded as „restrictions‟ 
within the meaning of Article 56(1) EC if they are likely to prevent or limit the acquisition 
of shares in the undertakings concerned or to deter investors of other Member States from 
investing their capital”.162 To this respect the Court pronounced in Commission v France 
that “they are therefore liable, as a result, to render the free movement of capital 
illusory”.163 
 
To recapitulate, the Commercial Banks Act Section 4(1) second sentence states that an 
authorisation under the Act shall be refused unless more than three-quarters of the 
commercial bank‟s share capital is subscribed in connection with a capital increase effected 
without any pre-emption rights for shareholders or others.
164
 A corresponding rule is 
included in the Insurance Act Section 2-1(1) fifth sentence. This clearly entails a limitation 
on the initial shareholdings in a financial institution. 
 
Section 4(2) of the CBA provides that:  “The King may authorise a commercial bank to be 
formed by three or more banks without an invitation to subscribe for shares, or without an 
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invitation to the public to subscribe for shares.”165 A similar rule does not exist in the 
Insurance Act. The King‟s jurisdiction is delegated to the Ministry of Finance.166  
 
This exception is just a minor derogation from the rule in paragraph one and does not 
change the main rule significantly. Additionally the exception does not provide a high 
degree of legal certainty, because it according to its wording grants the authorities full 
discretion (“may authorise”) and does not provide any indication of the circumstances in 
which this may happen or the relevant assessment criteria. Furthermore, the exception only 
applies to banks as founders of the financial institution. This means that individual or non-
financial institutional investors never will be exempt from the public offering rule, unless 
they wish to establish a niche financial institution. None of the preparatory works discuss 
the application of the exception rule.
167
  
 
In its Reasoned Opinion to Norway of December 2010, as mentioned above, the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority emphasised that the rules in question would always make it 
impossible for individuals, or other companies than the ones listed in the exception, to own 
more than 20 percent in a stock exchange or securities depository.
168
 Almost the opposite is 
the case for the public offering rules; they only regulate the shareholdings at the 
establishment of a financial institution. Subsequent acquisitions or increases in holdings are 
regulated by the provisions in the FIA which do not contain any ownership restrictions, as 
discussed in chapter 4. Such a transaction can happen at any time following the 
establishment of the institution. This undoubtedly makes the public offering rules seem less 
invasive, although still limiting initial shareholdings. 
 
To determine whether the rules constitute restrictions, we need to evaluate whether they 
still “prohibit, impede or render less attractive” or “limit or prevent the acquisition of 
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shares ... or .. deter investors .. from investing their capital”, in spite of their limited 
application. 
 
To an investor who wants to establish a financial institution in a Member State, there is 
clearly a difference between being able to establish the institution and to acquire a stake in 
an already existing one. From this point of view a limitation on the size of the shareholding 
he is allowed to own as the institution is established, can surely at least “render less 
attractive” such an investment in Norway, as well as “prevent the acquisition of shares” if 
he wished to own more than the accepted amount. The fact that an owner may increase his 
holding almost immediately following the establishment pulls somewhat in the opposite 
direction. However, even though this is the case in theory, it might not always be possible 
in practice. There might for example not be any additional shares to purchase or the 
authorities might not approve the proposed acquisition. 
 
From this point of view, it seems clear that the rules constitute a restriction on the freedom 
of establishment. A supporting argument to this effect is the abolishment of the 10 percent 
ownership restriction in the FIA that took place after the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
rendered it incompatible with Article 40 EEA. The rule was quite similar to the one 
discussed in the Reasoned Opinion to Norway of December 2010, and was founded on 
similar considerations as the public offering rule.
169
 The fact that the latter was introduced 
when the former was abolished, and without any clear explanation by the legislators, 
indicates to a certain degree that the public offering rules were meant to be a substitute for 
the 10 percent rule, or at least a safeguard to the dispersal of ownership and division of 
power. Whether or not this was the actual intention, it seems inconsistent that main features 
of a prohibition can live on in a changed form by formally terminating the ownership 
restriction rule. In this way the effect of the 10 percent restriction persists, although for a 
limited time span. 
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When the EFTA Surveillance Authority demanded a change in Norwegian legislation, 
Norwegian authorities argued that when assessing whether national legislation is in conflict 
with EEA law, one needs to take into consideration the alternative regulation – and not 
compare it to a situation where there is no regulation at all.
170
 However, in that particular 
case there was a clear alternative regulation in the prudential ownership control rules 
proscribed in the Banking Directive. In the current case, there is no clear alternative to the 
three-quarters public offering rule in EEA law. Thus, the rules can only be examined in 
comparison to a situation where such rules do not exist. 
 
In the case of movement of capital the answer might be more nuanced. As described above, 
there is a fine line between the freedom of establishment and movement of capital, which 
can be assessed in terms of the size of a shareholding. Seeing as the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority has indicated an approximation of 20 percent, or a little higher, as a threshold for 
the separation of establishment from movement of capital, a shareholding which is 
considered to fall within movement of capital needs to push against this threshold in order 
for the public offering rules to constitute a restriction on such movement of capital. 
Naturally, a shareholding below 20-25 percent is considered falling within the ambit of 
movement of capital. However, if it is not large enough to challenge the threshold, there 
will be no conflict with the right to free movement of capital, as a shareholding below 
24,99 is not prohibited by the public offering rules. Thus, as a generalisation, the public 
offering rules may constitute restrictions on the movement of capital. 
 
Accordingly, the Norwegian public offering rules of shares are likely to constitute 
restrictions against Articles 30 and 41 EEA in the eyes of EFTA Supervisory Authorities. 
Now the question remains whether there are possible justifications condoned by EEA law 
for keeping in place the Norwegian public offering rules. 
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5.3.4 Possible justifications 
The prohibition of restrictions on right of establishment and movement of capital are not 
absolute. For the right of establishment, this is expressed in Article 33 EEA, which states:  
 
“The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuit thereof shall not prejudice 
the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on ground of public policy, public 
security or public health.” 
 
This provision only regulates exceptions to restrictions that treat foreign nationals different 
from nationals and constitute the core exceptions. The chapter regulating capital 
movements has no corresponding rule at all. In line with its expansion of “restrictions” 
beyond national regulations which purely discriminate on grounds of nationality, the ECJ 
has developed a “general good” exception doctrine, which is not restricted to public policy, 
public security or public health. 
 
There are several cumulative conditions connected to the use of the general good as a 
barrier to free movement. As a qualifying condition to invoke the general good exception, 
the relevant domestic restriction must pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest. If 
this criterion is met, the test consists in determining whether the relevant measure is 
necessary, proportionate and suitable to achieve the legitimate aim.
171
 Additionally, the 
measure must be non-discriminatory and there must be an absence of harmonisation at EC 
level.
172
 We can establish right away that the criterion of non-discrimination is met by the 
Norwegian public offering rules. 
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5.3.4.1 A legitimate objective in the public interest 
The Norwegian public offering rules must represent a legitimate objective in the public 
interest. This is a fairly vague term, which has enabled the ECJ to review on a case-by-case 
basis whether a presented objective fulfils this requirement. On a general basis, the Court 
has refused to acknowledge motives of an economic nature, such as protection against 
foreign competitors, reduction of inflation or unemployment.  
 
The aims pursued by the public offering rules, as stated in various preparatory works, is the 
dispersal of ownership and accordingly a division of power, as well as prevention of so-
called “banker-banks”.173 This is connected to the need to secure independent financial 
institutions.
 174
 These motives are not among those generally accepted by the Court within 
the financial sector. However, we recall that the Norwegian rules have found no match in 
other EEA Countries. This suggests that the ECJ so far has had no occasion to evaluate 
their legitimacy. The Court has however accepted the motive of “financial market 
integrity” as a legitimate objective under the general good exception. If we view especially 
the aims of independent financial institutions and prevention of “banker-banks” from a 
wider market perspective, they may well constitute legitimate objectives in the public 
interest. Further considering that the legislative motives match those expressed for 
ownership restrictions in financial services and infrastructure institutions, which have been 
acknowledged by the EFTA Surveillance Authority as legitimate interest
175
, we hold that 
the public offering rules also pursue such legitimate objectives. 
 
5.3.4.2 Absence of harmonisation at Community level 
In areas where secondary legislation is enforced on a Community level, it is viewed as a 
codification of Member States‟ rights under the general good. This means that in these 
cases there is no room for Member States‟ application of the general good exception. 
However, the ECJ in any case needs to decide whether the relevant harmonisation is 
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sufficient to completely substitute the Member States‟ powers.176 Thus, the Court noted in 
the German Insurance Case that there were several supervisory issues that were not 
regulated by the Second Non-Life Insurance Directive, which granted the Member State the 
power to regulate foreign insurers based on the interest of the general good.
177
  
 
In the case of both credit institutions and insurance undertakings harmonisation on a 
Community level is sought through a long line of directives, cumulating in the current 
Banking and Insurance Directives, as amended by the Qualifying Holdings Directive. 
Based on the harmonisation criterion, this is a strong indication that there is no room for 
general good exceptions effected by Member States. In the area of provision of financial 
services, it has been accepted that the Directives provide full mutual recognition of 
regulatory standards, meaning that the general good can no longer be given as a 
justification for stricter cross-border applicable rules than the Directives allow.
178
  
 
In the case of primary establishment there is no existing mutual recognition, as the 
establishment of an institution in a Member State is a prerequisite for it to take effect. Even 
though the rules for the taking up of the business of financial institutions are harmonised 
through the Directives, we should take into consideration the explicit referral to the general 
good in the Directives, see e.g. recital 17 in the Banking Directive which states that “the 
host Member State should be able ... to require compliance with specific provisions of its 
own national laws and regulations on the Part of institutions not authorised as credit 
institutions in their home Member State ... provided that ... such provisions are compatible 
with Community law and are intended to protect the general good ...”. As discussed in 
chapter 5.2. there are indications that the Norwegian public offering rules are not directly 
covered by the Directives, which suggests an absence of harmonisation in this particular 
area. This would leave the authorities some powers to give regulations in the interest of the 
general good. Viewed in connection with Article 6 of the Banking Directive, which 
explicitly leaves to the Member State to set the conditions for authorisation, it seems likely 
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that the taking up of the business of financial institutions is not sufficiently harmonised to 
deny a Member State to invoke a general good exception. To this effect A.G. Mengozzi 
states in his Opinion in European Commission v Portuguese Republic that “in the absence 
of such Community harmonisation, it is for each Member State to establish the degree of 
protection it envisages affording to those legitimate interests and the way in which it is to 
be achieved ...”.179 In the absence of any relevant ECJ case law, we hold that the 
harmonisation criterion is met in the case of the Norwegian public offering rules.  
 
5.3.4.3 The criteria of suitability, necessity and proportionality 
In the case of credit institutions, the Banking Directive Articles 11 and 12 contain 
provisions relating to the suitability of owners and persons who will direct the business as 
part of the authorisation procedure. Article 11(1) provides:  
 
“The competent authorities shall grant an authorisation to the credit institution only when 
there are at least two persons who effectively direct the business of the credit institution. 
They shall not grant authorisation if these persons are not of sufficiently good repute or 
lack sufficient experience to perform such duties.” 
 
Article 12(1) subparagraph 1 provides: 
 
“The competent authorities shall not grant authorisation for the taking-up of the business 
of credit institutions unless they have been informed of the identities of the shareholders or 
members, whether direct or indirect, natural or legal persons, that have qualifying 
holdings, and of the amounts of those holdings.” Additionally, paragraph 2 states that: 
“The competent authorities shall not grant authorisation if, taking into account the need to 
ensure the sound and prudent management of a credit institution, they are not satisfied as 
to the suitability of the shareholders or members.” 
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According to Articles 11 and 12, rules which require a sound and prudent assessment of 
owners and managers is not only permitted but explicitly required. These rules are 
implemented in the Commercial Banks Act section 4 and the Insurance Act section 2-1.  
 
When assessing whether the Norwegian public offering rules are suitable, necessary and 
proportionate to fulfil their aims, we need to take into account that the current Banking 
Directive allows the refusal of authorisation if authorities are not satisfied with the 
suitability of the owners of the institution. The public offering rules are much more 
restrictive, as they effect a ban on initial ownership above 24.99 percent of the share capital 
in the financial institution, with limited and unclear exemptions only applicable to banks. 
The question of suitability seems to be affirmative, seeing as the rules meet their aims and 
considering Norway‟s strong battle to keep in place ownership restrictions in general. Thus 
we need to determine whether the prudential rules would be enough to secure the legitimate 
objectives, rendering the public offering rules unnecessary and disproportionate. 
The aims of achieving independent financial institutions free of moral hazard and conflicts 
of interests on behalf of owners and managers are connected to the “fitness” and 
“propriety” of these individuals or institutions, as protected by Articles 11 and 12 through 
the right to deny acquisitions on prudential grounds. From one point of view, one could 
argue that as long as a Member State possesses this right, they can safeguard the aims 
behind the public offering rules through these less restrictive means. 
In their response letter to the EFTA Surveillance Authority‟s Reasoned Opinion, Norway 
has pointed out that there are no alternative measures to the ownership restriction rules that 
would grant the same level of protection. They especially state that despite the general 
suitability of a shareholder, the criterion gives no control over the potential conflicts which 
might occur within the institution at a later time.
 180
 The same would be true for a financial 
institution. From this point of view the argument is that Norwegian authorities have sought 
a higher level of protection than envisaged by the Directive, and that the public offering 
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rules are necessary to achieve this chosen level of protection.  
 
The public offering rules are seemingly within the measures covered by Article 6 BD. 
However, even though the Directive does not provide detailed rules on the authorisation 
procedure and the States are left certain discretion, measures by national authorities still 
need to be proportionate to their aims.
181
  
 
As mentioned, the EFTA Surveillance Authority declared in its Reasoned Opinion that 
Norwegian rules pertaining to ownership restrictions of 20 percent in financial services 
infrastructure institutions legislation constitute a breach of Articles 31 and 40 EEA. The 
relevant rules in that case are rules which apply throughout the institutions‟ lifetime, and 
not only at the initial establishment, as is the case with the public offering rules. However, 
there are certain similarities, as both constitute restrictions on ownership in the respective 
institutions. Therefore some guidance can be drawn from the Surveillance Authority‟s 
Opinion. In regard to the general good assessment, the Authority points to the “crucial 
differences” between the ownership restriction rules and the sound and prudent assessment 
rules in the MiFID
182
. It emphasises that the ownership restriction in effect entails that all 
other investors than the ones exempt, are excluded from even being considered as suitable 
acquirers of holdings above 20 percent. It seems that the Authority is pointing to a 
disproportionality in the Norwegian rules. The Authority holds that “a ban without the 
possibility to have the suitability of an owner assessed cannot be considered compatible 
with the right of establishment and the free movement of capital”.183 These points are 
equally true for the public offering rules. 
 
Even though the answer is far from certain, it seems that against the background of an ever-
expanding interpretation by the ECJ of national measures which constitute “restrictions” 
under EC law, as mirrored by the EFTA Authorities, the Norwegian public offering rules 
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are likely not to be viewed as necessary, proportionate and suitable to safeguard otherwise 
legitimate objectives in the public interest. On these grounds, there is reason to believe that 
the EFTA Authorities, if called upon, would perceive the Norwegian public offering rules 
as constituting unjustified restrictions within Articles 31 and 40 EEA. If this were to 
happen, it would accordingly provide for a renewed assessment of the legitimacy of 
competent authorities‟ prudential assessment practice as discussed in 5.2. 
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